Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via "_txm_module_manager_memory_load" / "_txm_module_manager_in_place_load" — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in "TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE" is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB read ("code_size" trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as "code_start + preamble_offset" with only a "!= 0" check, and the preamble "checksum" never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded).