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CVE-2026-47768
Published:June 11, 2026
Updated:June 15, 2026
"internal/web/operators.go:251" — after "handleOperatorCreateAPIKey" mints a fresh 32-byte bearer token, the redirect points the operator's browser at: /ui/operators/<id>?new_key=<raw-token>&key_name=<name> The raw API key ends up: - in the browser's URL history - in the "Referer" header on every cross-origin asset the detail page loads (any third-party SVG/CSS/JS resource the layout pulls in) - in any reverse-proxy or load-balancer access log on the path (nginx default "combined" log captures the query string) - in any structured log sink the operator's local browser-history backup tool ships out "Authorization: Bearer <token>" headers go through the same hops without these problems because access logs typically don't capture request headers and the browser doesn't replay headers cross-origin. Same handler also appends "name" ("r.FormValue("name")") to the query string without "url.QueryEscape", so an "&" in the operator-supplied key name corrupts query parsing and a "\r\n" in older proxies could split response headers. Affected All released versions up to v0.3.1. Reproducer As admin, create an API key via "/ui/operators/<id>/api-keys" (form POST). The 303 Location header carries the raw token in the query string. Open browser DevTools → Network → response headers; or check the reverse-proxy access log; or check the operator-detail page's "Referer"-emitting fetches. Suggested fix Stash the raw key in a one-shot server-side flash storage (e.g., a row in "operator_sessions" keyed by session token, with a "one_shot_token" column and "consumed_at") or in a short-lived signed cookie. Render the key once inline on the detail page after the redirect, and clear the storage on render. Pattern mirrors the recovery-codes display in the TOTP flow. If the flash-storage refactor is too invasive, the minimal fix is to render the key inline via a "POST" → "200 OK with HTML" (no redirect), losing the post-redirect-get idiom but eliminating the URL exposure. Also fix "name" query encoding with "url.QueryEscape" regardless of which fix shape lands. CVSS estimate AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N — 5.5 (medium). AV:L because realistic exploit requires log-read access on shared infrastructure (proxy, CDN, browser-history backup) the operator's session touches.
Affected Packages
https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh.git (GITHUB):
Affected version(s) >=v0.2.0 <v0.3.2
Fix Suggestion:
Update to version v0.3.2
github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (GO):
Affected version(s) >=v0.1.0 <v0.3.2
Fix Suggestion:
Update to version v0.3.2
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CVSS v4
Base Score:
6.8
Attack Vector
LOCAL
Attack Complexity
LOW
Attack Requirements
NONE
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
HIGH
Vulnerable System Integrity
NONE
Vulnerable System Availability
NONE
Subsequent System Confidentiality
NONE
Subsequent System Integrity
NONE
Subsequent System Availability
NONE
CVSS v3
Base Score:
5.5
Attack Vector
LOCAL
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
HIGH
Integrity
NONE
Availability
NONE
Weakness Type (CWE)
Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
Use of HTTP Request With Sensitive Query String