Description The "Package.Unmarshal()" function in "pkg/types/alpine/apk.go" decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing "max_apk_metadata_size" check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine "ProposedEntry", the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints: - POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry) - POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery) Both invoke "V001Entry.Canonicalize()" → "fetchExternalEntities()" → "apk.Unmarshal(packageData)", which performs the unbounded decompression. Workarounds There is no effective workaround. Setting "max_request_body_size" reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting "max_apk_metadata_size" has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.