Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, "SQLChatAgent" in "langroid" ships a "_validate_query" defense-in-depth layer whose "_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS" regex blocklist enumerates dangerous SQL primitives by specific function name. The list misses the canonical PostgreSQL filesystem-disclosure family "pg_read_file()", "pg_stat_file()", "pg_ls_logdir()", "pg_ls_waldir()", "pg_current_logfile()" (and similar "SELECT"-shaped functions in the same family). It also leaves SQL Server "OPENDATASOURCE" and SQLite "ATTACH '<file>' AS x" (DATABASE keyword omitted) unblocked. An attacker able to shape the LLM's generated SQL (directly via prompt input or transitively via prompt-injection in data the LLM ingests) can read arbitrary files from the PostgreSQL host through ordinary "SELECT" queries, even with the agent's strict default configuration ("allow_dangerous_operations=False", "allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']"). The payloads survive the statement-type allowlist (each is a "SELECT") and pass through the regex blocklist (none of the function names match), then reach the live SQLAlchemy engine via "SQLChatAgent.run_query". Version 0.64.0 contains a patch for the issue.