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CVE-2026-53496
Published:July 17, 2026
Updated:August 02, 2026
Summary ExifReader 4.40.0 can throw an uncaught "RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView" while parsing crafted HEIC/AVIF files. The file only needs a valid leading "ftyp" box with a HEIC/AVIF major brand followed by a malformed ISO-BMFF box, such as an empty 8-byte "free" box or a truncated extended-size box. This is reachable through the public "ExifReader.load()" API for in-memory buffers and through the async file/URL loaders when an application parses attacker-supplied images. In applications that do not wrap every parse in a defensive try/catch, a single uploaded or fetched image can abort the request/worker and cause a denial of service. Credit requested: Yaohui Wang. Affected version tested - npm package: "exifreader" - Version: "4.40.0" - Repository commit tested: "8cb0261a26b7d986955fe0a6780f076dcb7902e7" Root cause The ISO-BMFF parser assumes that every top-level box with at least an 8-byte header also has enough bytes for the fields required by its parsed form. In "src/image-header-iso-bmff.js": - "findMetaBox()" calls "parseBox(dataView, offset)" while only checking that "offset + 8 <= dataView.byteLength". - "parseBox()" calls "getBoxLength()" and then unconditionally reads fields such as the full-box version byte for "meta"/"iloc"/"iinf"/"idat" boxes. - "getBoxLength()" handles "boxLength === 1" by calling "hasEmptyHighBits(dataView, offset)", which reads "dataView.getUint32(offset + 8)" without first checking that the 64-bit extended size field is present. As a result, syntactically small or truncated boxes after a valid HEIC/AVIF "ftyp" box escape the format-detection catch blocks and throw from the main parsing path. Reproduction Run this from the repository root against the committed "dist/exif-reader.js" bundle: const ExifReader = require('./dist/exif-reader.js'); function u32be(n) { return [(n >>> 24) & 255, (n >>> 16) & 255, (n >>> 8) & 255, n & 255]; } function ascii(s) { return Array.from(Buffer.from(s, 'ascii')); } function box(type, content = []) { return [...u32be(8 + content.length), ...ascii(type), ...content]; } for (const brand of ['heic', 'avif']) { for (const badBox of ['free', 'abcd']) { const bytes = Uint8Array.from([ ...box('ftyp', ascii(brand)), ...box(badBox), // 8-byte box header with no content ]); try { ExifReader.load(bytes.buffer); console.log("${brand}/${badBox}: no throw"); } catch (e) { console.log("${brand}/${badBox}: ${e.name}: ${e.message}"); console.log(String(e.stack).split('\n').slice(0, 6).join('\n')); } } } Observed output on Node v23.11.0 with ExifReader 4.40.0: heic/free: RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView at DataView.prototype.getUint8 (<anonymous>) at parseBox (.../dist/exif-reader.js:1:16513) at findMetaBox (.../dist/exif-reader.js:1:19032) at findOffsets (.../dist/exif-reader.js:1:19101) heic/abcd: RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView avif/free: RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView avif/abcd: RangeError: Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView A second variant triggers the extended-size path: const truncatedExtendedBox = [...u32be(1), ...ascii('free')]; const heic = Uint8Array.from([...box('ftyp', ascii('heic')), ...truncatedExtendedBox]); ExifReader.load(heic.buffer); That throws from "hasEmptyHighBits()" / "getBoxLength()" because the extended-size high/low fields are not present. Expected behavior Malformed/truncated metadata boxes should be handled like other malformed metadata in the project: return only the successfully parsed file type/metadata, return no app markers, or throw a controlled project-specific error. A safe JavaScript bounds error should not escape from the parser for an attacker-controlled image container. Security impact This is a denial-of-service issue for services that parse user-provided HEIC/AVIF files with ExifReader. A minimal attacker-controlled image buffer can cause an unhandled exception in the parser and abort the surrounding request/worker if the embedding application does not catch every parse error. Suggested severity: Medium. Suggested CVSS: "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L". Suggested fix Add explicit bounds checks before every "DataView" read in the ISO-BMFF box parser, especially: - before reading the 64-bit extended size fields in "getBoxLength()"; - before reading the full-box version byte in "parseBox()"; - before descending into "parseSubBoxes()" when a declared box length exceeds available bytes; - ensure "findMetaBox()" breaks on boxes whose declared length is invalid or not fully present. A regression test should cover "ftyp/heic" and "ftyp/avif" followed by an 8-byte empty "free"/unknown box and by a truncated extended-size box.
Affected Packages
exifreader (NPM):
Affected version(s) >=2.0.0 <4.40.1
Fix Suggestion:
Update to version 4.40.1
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CVSS v4
Base Score:
6.9
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Attack Requirements
NONE
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
NONE
Vulnerable System Integrity
NONE
Vulnerable System Availability
LOW
Subsequent System Confidentiality
NONE
Subsequent System Integrity
NONE
Subsequent System Availability
NONE
CVSS v3
Base Score:
5.3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
NONE
Integrity
NONE
Availability
LOW
Weakness Type (CWE)
Uncaught Exception
Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions