Impact The web handler "renderMobileBundle" ("internal/web/handlers.go:1325") passes the real "*pki.CAResolver" directly into "mobilebundle.Build". Inside "Build" ("internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54"), "resolver.LoadByID" decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a "*pki.CAManager", but "Build" never calls "CAManager.Wipe()" on any return path (success or any of the error paths at lines 56, 62, 68, 80, 86, 92, 98, 102, 109, 118, 150). As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and "Build" returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler ("internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:74") already does this correctly: it loads the "CAManager", "defer caMgr.Wipe()", and wraps it in "caManagerResolver". Only the web path is affected. This is the same key-zeroization class previously addressed in GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v. Patches Add "defer caMgr.Wipe()" inside "mobilebundle.Build" immediately after the "LoadByID" call so every caller (web and API) is protected on all return paths. Ensure "CAManager.Wipe()" is idempotent, since the API handler also wipes the same manager. Workarounds None at the configuration level; requires a code fix. Resources - "internal/web/handlers.go:1325" - "internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54" - "internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:74" (correct reference implementation) - Prior related advisory: GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v