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CVE-2026-55775
Published:June 19, 2026
Updated:June 21, 2026
Summary A user that is granted namespace management ("/sys/namespaces") capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path ""root"" in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself. Details Several endpoints under "/sys/namespaces/*" accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or "X-Vault-Namespace" header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on. Given the special namespace path ""root"" canonicalizes to en empty path (""""), when passed as "/sys/namespaces/root", the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on "/sys/namespaces/root" within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead. Impact Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to: - Look up - Delete - Lock - Patch custom metadata against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage "sys/namespaces/root" in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as "/api-lock". Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces. Patch This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5. PoC Start a development server: bao server -dev Create a namespace: bao namespace create victim This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of. Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, inside of the victim namespace. bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF path "sys/namespaces/*" { capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"] } EOF Then create a token with above policy attached: export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token) Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it: bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root
Affected Packages
https://github.com/openbao/openbao.git (GITHUB):
Affected version(s) >=v2.0.0-alpha20240329 <v2.5.5
Fix Suggestion:
Update to version v2.5.5
github.com/openbao/openbao (GO):
Affected version(s) >=v0.0.0-20231109181733-93b1d803cb32 <v0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae
Fix Suggestion:
Update to version v0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae
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CVSS v4
Base Score:
2.3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Attack Requirements
PRESENT
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
NONE
Vulnerable System Integrity
LOW
Vulnerable System Availability
LOW
Subsequent System Confidentiality
NONE
Subsequent System Integrity
NONE
Subsequent System Availability
NONE
CVSS v3
Base Score:
5.4
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
NONE
Integrity
LOW
Availability
LOW
Weakness Type (CWE)
Improper Authorization