Description Gitea's OAuth2 sign-in callback reactivates a deactivated user account ("IsActive=false") when the user signs in through an authentication source that does not issue refresh tokens (notably GitHub, and any OIDC/OAuth2 source configured without "offline_access"). PR #38009 added a gate intended to reactivate users only when the OAuth2 auto-sync cron had disabled them, using "the stored refresh token is empty" as the signal. That signal is wrong: for sources that never issue refresh tokens, an empty refresh token is the normal state of every user, so the gate cannot distinguish a cron-disabled account from one an administrator deliberately deactivated. The next time the administrator-deactivated user signs in through the provider, Gitea sets "IsActive=true" and grants a full session, silently undoing the administrator's action. This is the exact behavior #38009 was written to prevent. ("ProhibitLogin", the hard ban, is enforced separately and is not affected.) No special privileges are required beyond being the deactivated user and being able to sign in through the source. Root Cause "routers/web/auth/oauth.go" (the "handleOAuth2SignIn" reactivation gate): if !u.IsActive { extLogin, hasExt, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID) if err != nil { ctx.ServerError("GetExternalLogin", err); return } isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.RefreshToken == "" // wrong signal if isDisabledByAutoSync { opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true) // reactivates the account } } The assumption that "RefreshToken == """ is produced only by the auto-sync cron is false: - The cron's disable path is unreachable for sources without refresh tokens. "services/auth/source/oauth2/source_sync.go" returns early: "if !provider.RefreshTokenAvailable() { return ... }", so it never disables (or touches the tokens of) such users. - The stored token is exactly what the provider returned, with no synthesizing: "services/externalaccount/user.go" stores "RefreshToken: gothUser.RefreshToken". When the provider issues none, this is """" from the first login. - GitHub never issues a refresh token: "goth" hardcodes "func (p *Provider) RefreshTokenAvailable() bool { return false }" ("providers/github/github.go"). OIDC/OAuth2 without "offline_access" likewise store """". So for a GitHub (or no-refresh-token) source, "RefreshToken == """ is the state of every user, including one an administrator deactivated, and the gate reactivates them. Proof of Concept Setup: - A Gitea instance with a GitHub authentication source (Admin Panel -> Authentication Sources -> OAuth2 -> GitHub), or any OAuth2/OIDC source configured without "offline_access". - Account V: a normal user who has signed in at least once through that source (an "external_login_user" row exists with empty "refresh_token"). Steps: 1. As an administrator, open Admin Panel -> Users -> V and uncheck "Activated" ("is_active=false"). Confirm V's requests now bounce to the activation page. 2. As V, sign in again via "Sign in with GitHub" and complete the provider flow. 3. V lands in the application with a working session. "SELECT is_active FROM "user" WHERE lower_name='v';" now returns "true". Expected (intended by #38009): V stays "is_active=false" and is routed to the activation page. Actual: V is "is_active=true" with a full session — the administrator's deactivation is undone. - GitHub user, ADMIN deactivated refreshToken="" -> REACTIVATED + session granted <<< admin action undone - OIDC user w/ refresh token, ADMIN deactivated refreshToken="..." -> stays disabled (control) - OIDC user, AUTO-SYNC cron disabled refreshToken="" -> REACTIVATED (intended) RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED. Gitea's own regression test "TestOAuth2CallbackReactivationGating" ("auto-sync-disabled user is reactivated") sets "RefreshToken=""" and asserts reactivation after a full OIDC callback — that state is identical to a GitHub-source user an administrator deactivated. Impact Any Gitea instance using a GitHub authentication source (one of the most common) or an OIDC/OAuth2 source without refresh tokens, that relies on the "Activated" toggle to disable accounts, is affected. A deactivated user restores their own account to active and obtains a session, regaining whatever access the account had. Deactivation does not clear "IsAdmin", so a deactivated administrator regains admin access. Bound: accounts disabled with "Prohibit Login" stay blocked; this defeats the "IsActive=false" deactivation only.