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CVE-2026-57130
Published:July 20, 2026
Updated:August 02, 2026
Summary The email search tool in "src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py" constructs IMAP SEARCH commands by interpolating LLM-controlled parameters (from_addr, subject, query) directly into IMAP protocol strings using f-string formatting with double-quote delimiters. An attacker who can influence the arguments to the "search_emails" or "reply_email" tool (via crafted agent prompts) can inject arbitrary IMAP commands, potentially exfiltrating email data from other folders, deleting emails, or performing other unauthorized IMAP operations. Details Vulnerable code (lines 493–502): criteria = [] if from_addr: criteria.append(f'FROM "{from_addr}"') if subject: criteria.append(f'SUBJECT "{subject}"') if query: criteria.append(f'TEXT "{query}"') if not criteria: criteria.append("ALL") search_str = " ".join(criteria) status, data = mail.search(None, search_str) The "from_addr", "subject", and "query" parameters originate from LLM tool call arguments (the "search_emails" public function at line 665). These values flow through without any sanitization or escaping. The double-quote (""") characters in these parameters allow breaking out of the IMAP SEARCH quoted string context. Additional injection points: - Line 416: "mail.search(None, f'HEADER Message-ID "{search_id}"')" - Line 447: Same pattern in "_smtp_reply_email" - Line 542: Same pattern in "_smtp_archive_email" The "search_id" / "message_id" parameter in these functions is also LLM-controlled via the "reply_email" and "archive_email" public tool functions. Reachability: The "search_emails", "reply_email", and "archive_email" functions are exposed as agent tools. They are reachable when an agent is configured with email tools (EMAIL_ADDRESS + EMAIL_PASSWORD environment variables set). This is a documented deployment scenario for email-capable agents. PoC Setup: Requires an IMAP server (not run here — this is a static proof). The vulnerability is demonstrated by tracing the data flow. Positive trigger — IMAP injection via "search_emails": An LLM agent processing a crafted prompt calls: search_emails(from_addr='user@example.com" LOGOUT') This produces the IMAP command: SEARCH FROM "user@example.com" LOGOUT" The "LOGOUT" command is injected after the prematurely closed quoted string, causing the IMAP connection to be terminated. More severe injection — exfiltrate emails from another folder: search_emails(query='" SEARCH RETURN (MIN) ALL') Produces: "TEXT "" SEARCH RETURN (MIN) ALL"" — injects a secondary SEARCH command. Negative control — legitimate search: search_emails(from_addr='user@example.com') Produces: "FROM "user@example.com"" — correct, no injection. Cleanup: No persistent changes for read-only injection. For destructive injection (DELETE, EXPUNGE), impact persists. Impact An attacker who can craft prompts that cause an LLM agent to call "search_emails" with injection payloads can: - Terminate IMAP connections (denial of service) - Inject arbitrary IMAP commands — including LIST (enumerate folders), SELECT (switch folders), FETCH (read emails from other mailboxes), STORE (modify flags), COPY/MOVE (move emails), DELETE/EXPUNGE (permanently delete emails) - Exfiltrate email contents from folders the user did not intend to expose to the agent - Permanently delete emails via injected DELETE + EXPUNGE commands The attack requires the IMAP backend to be configured (EMAIL_ADDRESS + EMAIL_PASSWORD env vars), which is a documented and common deployment for email-capable agents. Suggested remediation 1. Escape double-quote characters in IMAP parameters. Per RFC 3501, literal strings use "{n}\r\n" format or quoted strings with "" escaping: def _escape_imap_string(s: str) -> str: """Escape a string for safe use in IMAP quoted strings.""" Use IMAP literal syntax for safety: {length}\r\n<data> encoded = s.encode('utf-8') return f'{{{len(encoded)}}}\r\n{encoded}' 2. Use IMAP literal syntax ("{n}\r\ndata") instead of quoted strings for all user-controlled parameters. This prevents any injection regardless of content. 3. Apply the escaping to all IMAP search criteria parameters: "from_addr", "subject", "query", and "search_id"/"message_id".
Affected Packages
praisonaiagents (PYTHON):
Affected version(s) >=0.0.1 <1.6.59
Fix Suggestion:
Update to version 1.6.59
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CVSS v4
Base Score:
8.6
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Attack Requirements
NONE
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Vulnerable System Confidentiality
HIGH
Vulnerable System Integrity
HIGH
Vulnerable System Availability
NONE
Subsequent System Confidentiality
NONE
Subsequent System Integrity
NONE
Subsequent System Availability
NONE
CVSS v3
Base Score:
8.1
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
HIGH
Integrity
HIGH
Availability
NONE
Weakness Type (CWE)
Improper Input Validation
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')