Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called "ApprovalInbox" ("lib/approval-inbox.ts"). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which "ApprovalGate" uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *" on every route, including the state-changing "POST /approvals/:id/approve" and "/deny". As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. "ApprovalInbox" now accepts a "secret" option. When set, the mutating endpoints "POST /:id/approve" and "POST /:id/deny" require an "Authorization: Bearer <secret>" header, validated in constant time with "crypto.timingSafeEqual". "startServer()" already binds to "127.0.0.1" by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.