In Eclipse Che versions 7.29.0 and later, the GET "/api/scm/resolve" and "POST /api/factory/resolver" endpoints pass an attacker-controlled URL to "URLFetcher.fetch()", which calls "new URL(url).openConnection()" with no scheme or host allow-list and returns the response body to the caller. Any authenticated Che user can read arbitrary local files via the file:// scheme (including the pod's Kubernetes service-account token at "file:///var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"), reach internal HTTP services and cloud instance metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and have their stored SCM personal access token attached as an "Authorization" header to a host of their choosing. The same credential-forwarding behavior also fires when a victim opens a workspace from a malicious devfile whose "parent.uri" points to an attacker-controlled server, enabling exfiltration of the victim's SCM PAT without direct API access. No fix is available.