VVE-2020-0001 Earlier today, we received a responsible disclosure of a potential issue from @montyly (security researcher at @trailofbits) for Vyper users who make assumptions about what values certain interface types can return. Impact We determined the issue to be mild and unlikely to be exploited, with an easy workaround while the correct resolution is in process. The issue stems from a number of things, which we will detail here. (1) The ABI Specification is under-defined such that function return type is not always reflected in how you use it This means that a function which returns "uint8" under the hood actually returns a 32 byte integer, making it identical to a function that returns "uint256". This allows users to read an interface that returns a "uint8" value to be stored into a "uint256" variable without any explicit casting or input validation. (2) Vyper doesn't have "uint8" types When Vyper was originally created, it only had one numeric type, but we added just enough types to be able to work with the majority of ERC interfaces that exist. Unfortunately, we never added "uint8", because it's only majority usage was for "ERC20.decimals()" as the return type, which isn't reflected in the method ID. Because of (1), it didn't matter that we didn't have these types implemented because you could capture the return value as "uint256" and use it just fine. (3) "ERC20.decimals()" returns "uint8" "ERC20.decimal()" (which is an optional function) returns a "uint8" type. While it was never intentioned to be used directly within a smart contract (hence being optional), someone could easily make the decision to rely on it to perform important functionality within their Vyper smart contract. This might lead to a scenario where an unexpectedly large value (> 255) returned by calling this function (which a malicious contract writer might write) would allow an attacker to manipulate or bypass certain logic depending on this value. In summary, because of (1), it isn't necessary to have to cast the return value of a function that returns "uint8" to "uint256", and because of (2) it isn't possible to have the type system protect against this type of error. This could lead to scenarios like (3) where this behavior can be exploited. Patches We are currently refactoring our typing system so we can implement all ABI-compliant integer types, but no currently patched version is available that gives users access to the "uint8" type. Workarounds There is an easy workaround where you should check that the value returned by an interface which specifies "uint8" should be checked to be within the bounds of a "uint8" integer. As an example: ... returns uint8, but we implicitly cast to uint256 without checking decimals: uint256 = ERC20(_token).decimal() FIX: Insert this line assert decimals < 256 ... Depending on how you use this value, it may not be necessary to insert this check. References * "ABI Specification" (https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/abi-spec.html) For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Chat with us in "our gitter " (https://gitter.im/vyperlang/community) * Open an issue in "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper" (https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper) * Email us at "security@vyperlang.org" (mailto:security@vyperlang.org)